al Qaeda's message

Today's online news selections offer two differing views on the recent video taped message from Ayman al Zawahiri, the No. 2 man in al Qaeda's terror network.  First, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross writes in the Weekly Standard,

AFTER AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI released a new videotape on August 4, the media focused on how he placed the blame for the last month's terrorist attacks in London on Tony Blair's shoulders and threatened even greater carnage in the future. Less noticed but no less important is al Qaeda's changed tactical approach to the West: They are now attempting to convince Westerners that they are worth negotiating with and can be appeased.

Zawahiri put forth this idea in a section of the tape where he speaks directly to Americans. In it, he mentions the hudna, or truce, that Osama bin Laden offered last year in exchange for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Muslim world. Zawahiri asks, "Didn't Osama bin Laden tell you that you would never dream of peace until we actually live it in Palestine and before all foreign forces withdraw from the Land of Muhammad?"

In arguing that Westerners can buy peace through accession to al Qaeda's demands, the group's leaders emphasize three issues that they believe will have traction in the West: withdrawal from Iraq, ending support for Israel, and military disengagement from the Middle East.

The notion that al Qaeda can be appeased is, of course, false.

Among other things this represents al Qaeda's recognition of the lessons of Vietnam.  Military victory for al Qaeda is impossible.  Victory for al Qaeda must be achieved politically, so Zawahiri's message is intended to erode political support for the war on terror and the war in Iraq among the American electorate.  The aim is to compel a political decision to withdraw.  Too many Americans have learned the lessons of Vietnam as well, so this is not likely to happen.

The second take on Zawahiri's message can be found in the Washington Times.  Claude Salhani writes that the true import of the message is not in the words but in the picture -- specifically the ever present Kalashnikov propped up in the background.

At first glance, the weapon passes for a Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifle, initially built by the Soviets, but since cloned by several former Eastern Bloc countries, as well as by Yugoslavia, China and North Korea. More than 50 armies in the world have firearms created by Kalashnikov.

But a closer inspection of the weapon reveals it has a little black tube attached under the barrel, quite similar to the ones on the American M-16, which turns it into an M-203 grenade launcher.

The disturbing fact in this instance is that al Zawahiri is making a bold statement in showing off his new hardware. New, sophisticated weapons, such as the one in the video are not the kind peddled by arms dealers in shady backwater Middle East arms bazaars. This weapon appears to be a state-of-the-art modern gun made in either China or North Korea.

Quick research shows the weapon behind al Zawahiri is called a Wz. 1974 Pallad grenade launcher. According to the Kalashnikov Web site, the attachment was initially developed in the late 1960s to replace the not entirely successful Wz. 1960.72 grenade-launching adaptations of the AK. But as is often the case, the plans remained shelved for many years before it was developed and manufactured.

The appearance of this weapon elicits this conclusion.

One of the problems in fighting, particularly affecting undercover agents, is troop morale, explains Mr. Henderson. And when sleeper agents hiding in the West see brand-new weapons of that caliber on television, Mr. Henderson says "it sends a message saying we are not out of it, not by a long shot."

"Meanwhile, North Korea, China and half a dozen other nations are having their diplomatic discussions about maintaining peace in that region, and all the while [North Korean leader] Kim [Jong Il] is selling Kalashnikovs to al Qaeda, and thinking us the fools. They have the perfect distraction, Iraq, while they rebuild too," said the former Marine.

"While we are being distracted by Iraq, al Qaeda is regrouping and reorganizing," said Mr. Henderson.

That conclusion strikes me as bordering on hysteria.  It's possible that governments are supplying al Qaeda, but if they are, they risk becoming the enemy as Saddam Hussein was the enemy.  State supported terrorism is the crime that won't be tolerated.  I won't pretend to be any kind of military expert, but I'm confident that no collection of sophisticated grenade launchers is going to swing the tide in favor of al Qaeda.  No sane head of state will put weapons powerful enough to swing that tide into the hands of terrorists whose aims are to annihilate a people and to dominate the world through the spread of radical fundamentalist religion.

For reasons that escape me our mainstream press often seems a willing ally to al Qaeda, and aids al Qaeda's efforts to weaken Western resolve.  Events on the ground in Iraq may have quite a different significance from what the press ascribes.  Wretchard at Belmont Club offers a more balanced view.  Today's post introduced me to Michael Yon who is embedded with troops in Mosul.  Mr. Yon's reports are rivetting.

The Chief wanted the prisoner. "Please leave him with me."

During lunch, the Chief persisted in his entreaties to LTC Kurilla, saying his police would find all the bombs, break the cell, and give the prisoner back tomorrow at the latest. And they could. The Iraqi Police could break the cell because they can break the man.

Terrorists often target Iraqi police--especially this station--so the Chief was becoming frustrated, and he continued to angle for the opportunity to interrogate the prisoner, suggesting creative ways to circumvent the inconvenient rules, like, "Let him go and we will catch him again." But LTC Kurilla kept reiterating, “You know I can’t give him to you. I might not agree with all the rules, but I must enforce them."

"Give him to me, just for the night," the Chief said. "You can have him back tomorrow."

"That I cannot do," Kurilla replied firmly. "If your police had been with us when we captured him, you could have him. But these are the rules."

Wretchard speculates.

(Speculation alert) We are probably going to have to wait a decade to find out how the battle of Mosul was fought out. But I think it is probable that a large role will have been played by electronic warfare in particular and information warfare in general. Both sides are trying to get inside the decision cycles of their opponents and Yon's description of the failed IED ambush at the traffic circle is a case in point. The enemy covers the IED amush site with snipers and the Americans cover the area with rotary wing. Yon is afraid mortars will hit the traffic circle but lets on that the mortars are afraid of counterbattery. So they disengage. Ambush counter ambush. The enemy makes a special target of EOD troopers but maybe the EOD guys have a few tricks up their own sleeves. The bombmakers target Americans and Americans target the bombmakers. The Americans refuse to leave the IED triggerman with the Mosul cops, after trailing him all over his neighborhood.  After the raid whose outcome we'll know in the next Yon installment, that triggerman may want to change his address and maybe get some plastic surgery into the bargain. I'm going to guess that Mosul is one of those engagements which will make the word 'database' a synonym for weapon and 'cover story' equivalent in certain situations to overhead cover.

Read Wretchard and follow the links to Michael Yon.