There’s an aspect to the discussion of pre-war intelligence on Iraq’s weapons systems, besides the questions of what we knew versus what we should have known. We should consider the particular timing of this discussion. What’s been playing out in Congress and in the media at the moment displaces any serious discussion of the invasion as a national security strategy. It’s a discussion we ought to have had by now.
The timing is the tip off. While it may seem slightly off topic, I’d like to bring up a post by Mohammed Fadhil of Iraq the Model in which he wondered about Congressman John P. Murtha’s demand for the immediate withdrawal of troops from Iraq.
I can’t imagine why Mr. Murtha said something like “is evident that continued military action in Iraq is not in the best interests of the United States of America, the Iraqi people or the Persian Gulf region”.
It is really strange when a US representative says something like this few weeks after the elected Iraqi government demanded from the UN to extend the mission of coalition forces for another year; apparently my government (and I) do not think that US military presence is harmful for us and the Arab League also thinks that an immediate withdrawal would be disastrous for Iraq and the region.
His perplexity comes from making a chronological connection between the congressman’s demand for withdrawal and the Iraqi request for extension. Murtha’s demand makes little sense in that context. But when considered in the wake of the indictment of Vice President Cheney's chief of staff Scooter Libby, who was charged with perjury, obstruction of justice, and lying to the grand jury, it makes perfect sense. The Democrats perceive a point of vulnerability in President Bush and his Administration. They see an opportunity for attack too tempting to pass up.
Murtha’s foray against the Administration had nothing to do with Iraq. There's no chance Bush will order a pull out. Murtha knew it. The seriousness of his demand is best measured by the speed and margin by which it was voted down.
It was past 10 p.m. when Murtha addressed a relatively subdued House. Hunter's resolution "is not what I envisioned" because it avoids a broader debate of the war, which "is not going as advertised," Murtha said. "The American people are way ahead of us" in wanting a strategy to bring the troops home, he added. "It's easy to sit in your air-conditioned offices and send them into battle."
Could he be right? We American people believe the troops were sent over there so we could work out a strategy for bringing them home?
This continuing incoherence on the part of the Democrats is best explained in the context of domestic politics. Discussion of pre-war intelligence is part of a political strategy that has nothing to do with Iraq. If the Democrats had real concerns over pre-war intelligence, you’d expect a little worry over what might have become of those WMD that never turned up. In whose hands might they be now? Somehow that escapes their interest. The usefulness of this debate is in its value as a bludgeon. The pretense is national security. The aim is the next election. The nation and the world now focus on whose fault it is that the Democrats have never had a clue.
Meanwhile, an overarching strategy in favor of Saddam’s removal remains hidden from public view by Democrats’ continued high profile insistence that they were misled and mistaken. Michael Scott Doran, formerly Assistant Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, is now on the National Security Council staff in charge of the Middle East. In the January/February 2003 issue of Foreign Affairs his article, Palestine, Iraq, and American Strategy, sums up the strategy this way.
Unless America is prepared to abandon its position and pull back from the region, as the British did three and a half decades ago, it must carry its struggle against al Qaeda and Saddam to the finish, putting an end to all doubt regarding its resolve. Thwarting Saddam's ambitions and continuing to root out bin Laden's henchmen and associates, moreover, will do more than take care of immediate menaces. It will also serve to sober up onlookers with oppositionist ambitions of their own, making them recalculate the odds of defying a power that has demonstrated its intention to remain a permanent and dynamic regional player.
Once the near enemies have been bested, however, the moment will arrive to launch a vigorous and sustained effort to address the far enemies, as the crucial second stage in strengthening the Pax Americana. Unless the suppression of Saddam is seen to lead to a better life for the Iraqi population, and unless American strength and resolve is used on behalf of all the region's people, not simply the governments of American allies, then a new set of near enemies will certainly arise and have to be dealt with in their turn. In the long run, the strength and passion of Palestine-as-symbol will be sapped only by the creation of a new, more persuasive historical narrative that allows the people of the Middle East to see the United States, and the West more generally, as their partner in the quest for a better life.
To deny that there might be a geopolitical strategy at work, one must resolutely avoid looking at any maps. Back when the invasion of Iraq was contemplated, Democrats complained that Saddam Hussein was the wrong enemy. The known nuclear capabilities of North Korea made it the greater threat they said, one they demanded we address unilaterally. Even more dangerous than North Korea was Iran. Since that time multilateral diplomatic efforts involving Japan, China, and South Korea along with North Korea and the United States have moved forward. While North Korea remains a threat it’s a diminished threat due to the combined diplomatic effort. And what about Iran?
Prior to September 11, 2001 Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and to some degree Pakistan were nations hostile to America. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, Pakistan required very little in the way of persuasion to join us in the war on terror. Subsequently, knocking over the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has given us a new ally and a potential base of operations. A peek at the map shows that Iran’s eastern border is occupied by American allies, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
While we all would like things to move more quickly, Iraq is settling down as a democratic ally of the United States. Another peek at the map shows Iran’s western border occupied by Iraq and Turkey. Iran is quickly becoming surrounded by American allies, and they are allies who are getting very tired of terrorist bombs going off in their midst. They are allies who know where those bombs are coming from.
Since the writing of his article, Mr. Doran’s prediction that regional onlookers would sober up has come true. The nuclear black market network of A.Q. Khan has been uncovered, Syria has ended its occupation of Lebanon, Libya has renounced pursuit of nuclear weapons, and even relations between Pakistan and India have improved. It’s not unreasonable to anticipate by 2008 Iraq will be stable, Iran will be surrounded, and multilateral diplomatic efforts to persuade both Iran and North Korea to forsake nuclear arms will be a continuing effort. One base of terrorist operation, Afghanistan, has been eliminated. Iraq will soon follow.
But for the Democrats to step back and look at the big picture would rob them of political opportunity. Their focus on pre-war intelligence is an attempt to dissect the rationale for taking one step in a larger strategy that seeks to fight the terrorists head on and keep the terrorists from acquiring nuclear capability. Suffice it to say, the Democrats have their own ambitions. Their focus on pre-war intelligence at this particular time is their leverage for achieving them. Nothing more.
