Thomas Joscelyn examines the evolving positions of Mary McCarthy and her cohorts over the Clinton Administration's decision to bomb that Sudanese pharmaceutical plant. The factory was suspected of producing nerve gas, and was believed by the Clinton Administration to be a joint venture between Iraq and al Qaeda.
Richard Clarke defended the intelligence linking Iraqi scientists to al Qaeda in the months following the strike. The 9-11 Commission's report adds that Clarke "for years had read intelligence reports on Iraqi-Sudanese cooperation on chemical weapons." McCarthy's fellow NSC staffers Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon give an impassioned defense of the strike on al-Shifa in their book The Age of Sacred Terror. Not to mention that the CIA reported to Congress that Iraq was working on chemical and possibly biological weapons programs in Sudan every year from 1998 through 2002. The language used in 1999 was typical:
In the WMD arena, Sudan has been developing the capability to produce chemical weapons for many years. In this pursuit, it has obtained help from entities in other countries, principally Iraq. Given its history in developing CW and its close relationship with Iraq, Sudan may be interested in a BW program as well.
WHERE DOES ALL OF THAT LEAVE US? In a rather bizarre circle of logic. McCarthy's former colleagues Clarke, Benjamin, and Simon argue that: (a) the decision to strike al-Shifa was justified because (b) the intelligence connecting Iraqi chemical weapons experts to al Qaeda's chemical weapons efforts was sound, but (c) this doesn't mean that Iraq and al Qaeda had a significant relationship because (d) somehow this collaboration occurred without either party realizing that it was working with the other.
An accidental connection? Right.
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