The William Hamilton of the Washington Post critiques Bob Woodward's new book on the Bush Administration. The headline reads, Card Urged Bush to Replace Rumsfeld, Woodward Says. According to Hamilton, Woodward's book, State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III, describes a Rumsfeld as arrogant, closed minded, and indecisive, and Bush in a state of denial over it, refusing all entreaties to get rid his embattled Secretary of Defense.
We are then provided with supporting excerpts, cataloging the ignored realities.
A year later, Rumsfeld received an even more blunt criticism from Steve Herbits, a longtime friend who according to Woodward has served as an informal adviser to Rumsfeld since he became defense secretary. In a seven-page memo in July, 2005, entitled, "Summary of Post-Iraq Planning and Execution Problems," Herbits listed a series of questions for Rumsfeld:
* "Who made the decision and why didn't we reconstitute the Iraqi Army?"
* "Did no one realize we were going to need Iraqi security forces?"
* "Did no one anticipate the importance of stabilization and how best to achieve it?"
* "Why was the de-Baathification so wide and deep?"
Here's the part that puzzles me. If we identified and fired the guy responsible for disbanding the Iraqi Army and we reconstituted the army instead, and if we resisted de-Baathification or made it less severe, who can say with any certainty the situation in Iraq would be any more stable or in any way better than it is now?
I suspect the basis of the controversy over Rumsfeld's tactics goes back to a misunderstanding of Bush's strategies. It was not Bush's plan to knock over Saddam to install younger members of his faction in his place. The point of going into Iraq was to begin a process of political reform, democratization, in the Middle East.
Unless the suppression of Saddam is seen to lead to a better life for the Iraqi population, and unless American strength and resolve is used on behalf of all the region's people, not simply the governments of American allies, then a new set of near enemies will certainly arise and have to be dealt with in their turn.
Keeping this strategic objective in mind is key to understanding Rumsfeld's tactics. Ignoring the strategic objective leads to useless and pointless second guessing.