The Washington Post has pulled out the stops this week with a barrage of stories intended to eradicate any semblance of support for the war in Iraq. On Tuesday the Post featured a front page article, How Bogus Letter Became a Case for War. It's about the Niger forgeries. However, contrary to what one might expect, author Peter Eisner never says how they became a case for war. The best he can do is show that the documents were ultimately behind a request by Vice President Cheney for more information from the CIA.
Almost four months later, on Feb. 5, 2002, the CIA received more information from Sismi, including the verbatim text of one of the documents. The CIA failed to recognize that it was riddled with errors, including misspellings and the wrong names for key officials. But it was a separate DIA report about the claims that would lead Cheney to demand further investigation. In response, the CIA dispatched Wilson to Niger.
So the Vice President asked a question, and the CIA sent former ambassador Joseph C. Wilson off to Africa for the answer, purportedly to determine whether or not Niger sold uranium to Iraq. Wilson returned to report, among other things, that no such deal was made. But as it turned out, Wilson's report was never delivered to Cheney. This is according to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, which had this to say about Wilson's report.
(U) DIA and CIA analysts said that when they saw the intelligence report they did not believe that it supplied much new information and did not think that it clarified the story on the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal. They did not find Nigerien denials that they had discussed uranium sales with Iraq as very surprising because they had no expectation that Niger would admit to such an agreement if it did exist. The analysts did, however, find it interesting that the former Nigerien Prime Minister said an Iraqi delegation had visited Niger for what he believed was to discuss uranium sales.
(U) Because CIA analysts did not believe that the report added any new information to clarify the issue, they did not use the report to produce any further analytical products or highlight the report for policymakers. For the same reason, CIA's briefer did not brief the Vice President on the report, despite the Vice President's previous questions about the issue.
Bottom line: The Niger forgeries were part of the case for war only to the extent that were the impetus for Wilson's trip to Africa. So while the Post article implies that administration officials were taken in, an alternative explanation for the purpose of the forgeries suggests they were not. A theory in blog circles has been aired that suggests that forgeries as obvious as these could just as well have been intended to discredit the idea that Iraq was after uranium and to head off an invasion of Iraq.
Today the Post fires another front page salvo in the battle to get American troops out of Iraq with the publication of Hussein's Prewar Ties To Al-Qaeda Discounted. This one regurgitates a favorite theme of the Democrats: There was no connection between al Qaeda and the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, and administration claims to the contrary are at best a stretch.
The declassified version of the report, by acting Inspector General Thomas F. Gimble, also contains new details about the intelligence community's prewar consensus that the Iraqi government and al-Qaeda figures had only limited contacts, and about its judgments that reports of deeper links were based on dubious or unconfirmed information. The report had been released in summary form in February.
The story was reported in February as well, but yesterday's declassification provided another opportunity to air the old charges against the Bush Administration. Key paragraphs in CBS News February coverage, Pentagon Watchdog Slams Prewar Intel, asked a relevant question.
"I'm trying to figure out why we are here," said Sen. Saxby Chambliss, R-Ga., saying the office was doing its job of analyzing intelligence that had been gathered by the CIA and other intelligence agencies.
Gimble responded that at issue was that the information supplied by Feith's office in briefings to the National Security Council and the office of Vice President Dick Cheney was "provided without caveats" that there were varying opinions on its reliability.
According to today's Post article, both Feith and his successor got in their own slams against the Pentagon watchdog.
Feith has vigorously defended his work, accusing Gimble of "giving bad advice based on incomplete fact-finding and poor logic," and charging that the acting inspector general has been "cheered on by the chairmen of the Senate intelligence and armed services committees." In January, Feith's successor at the Pentagon, Eric S. Edelman, wrote a 52-page rebuttal to the inspector general's report that disputed its analysis and its recommendations for Pentagon reform.
As it happens Edelman's 52-page rebuttal is available for viewing or download at the Department of Defense web site. It contains a summary of 14 errors in the Inspector General's report. It also indicates that the reason that analysis was undertaken by Feith in the first place was to give the intelligence a look independent of the prevailing assumption that Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda would never cooperate with each other.
(U) The Deputy Secretary of Defense ("Deputy" or "DSD") directed his Special Assistant in his front office and two staff members in OUSD(P) to take a fresh, critical look at Intelligence Community ("IC") reporting on contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida. In working on the Deputy's tasking, one of the OUSD(P) staffers prepared an internal memo containing two commentary paragraphs followed by a list summarizing IC reports on contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida. The staffers wrote up the critique requested by DSD in the form of a draft briefing that discussed IC reports on Iraq-al-Qaida contacts and how these reported contacts might be viewed absent an a priori assumption that secular Baathists and Islamic extremists would never cooperate.
Let me pick out just one paragraph from the summary of the Inspector General's alleged errors.
(U) While some of the work reviewed in this Project did characterize the Iraq-al- Qaida relationship as "cooperative," that characterization did not contradict IC judgments on the subject at the time. To the contrary, the reference in .the draft briefing to a "cooperative" Iraq-al-Qaida relationship was consistent with the DCI's own statements to Congress in 2002 and 2003. He said then that "we have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida going back a decade," "credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qaida have discussed safe haven and reciprocal non-aggression," "we have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al- Qaida members," "the reporting also stated that Iraq has provided training to al-Qaida members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs," etc. The Draft Report ignores these DCI statements.
The Intelligence Community's apparently rigid assumption that the Baathists were not interested in cooperating with radical Islamists was also contradicted by the mosque-building campaign Saddam Hussein had undertaken in the years prior to 9/11. While a 2001 Telegraph report on the subject concluded that Saddam's religious rebirth was nothing more than a means of bolstering his dictatorship, it could also have been an image building move intended to bolster his popularity with al Qaeda and similar organizations.
In any case, there is nothing new in either of these stories. There is still no clue as to where the Niger forgeries originated nor is there any new information as to why they were made. The most plausible reason is that somebody was trying to make a buck. There is also nothing new on subject of prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq. The reason both of these stories are back on the front pages of the Washington Post is most likely to be found in the political preferences of the Post editorial board. Democrats are now in control of congress and about to enter a showdown with the Bush Administration over the war in Iraq. Post reporting gives them cover.
Nice post
More proof the Baathists had little problem working with al Qaeda,
Here is a list of over a hundred that have been CAUGHT working with them
http://regimeofterror.com/archives/2006/05/former_baathists_found_working/
I am actually doin another post, updated, on this in the next few day.
Posted by: Mark Eichenlaub | April 07, 2007 at 12:33 PM