What we know

Frederick W. Kagan, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Kimberly Kagan, president of the Institute for the Study of War, say they arrive at no conclusion as to whether Nouri al Maliki or Moqtada al Sadr came out ahead from Maliki's recent Iraqi operations against illegal Shia militias.  But from their assessments of what we know and what we don't know indicate it's clear that they see positive signs.

* The legitimate Government of Iraq and its legally-constituted security forces launched a security operation against illegal, foreign-backed, insurgent and criminal militias serving leaders who openly call for the defeat and humiliation of the United States and its allies in Iraq and throughout the region. We can be ambivalent about the political motivations of Maliki and his allies, but we cannot be ambivalent about the outcome of this combat between our open allies and our open enemies.

* The Sadrists and Special Groups failed to set Iraq alight despite their efforts--Iraqi forces kept the Five Cities area (Najaf, Karbala, Hillah, Diwaniyah, and Kut) under control with very little Coalition assistance; Iraqi and Coalition forces kept Baghdad under control.

* Sadr never moved to return to Iraq, ordered his forces to stop fighting without achieving anything, and further demonstrated his dependence on (and control by) Iran.

* Maliki demonstrated a surprising and remarkable commitment to fighting Iranian-backed Special Groups, JAM fighters, and even criminal elements of JAM. The Iraqi Government has loudly declared that "enforcing the law" applies to Shia areas as well as Sunni. Maliki has called Shia militias "worse than al Qaeda." These are things we've been pressing him to do for nearly two years.

* We've said all along that we did not think the ISF was ready to take care of the security situation on its own. Maliki was overconfident and overly-optimistic. But for those who keep pressing the Iraqis to "step up," here's absolute proof that they are willing. Are we willing to support them when they do what we demand? Can anyone reasonably argue that they will do better if we pull out completely?

* On March 30, Sadr ordered his followers to stop fighting. This decision contrasts with his 2004 decision to fight on, and his continued presence in Iran combined with this surrender results from weakness, rather than strength.

Austin Bay sees a whittling away of al Sadr's influence.

The Iraqi way often appears to be indecisive, until you learn to look at its counter-insurgency methods in the frame of achieving political success, instead of the frame of American presidential elections.

In southern Iraq and east Baghdad, Sadr once again lost street face. Despite the predictable media umbrage, this translates into political deterioration.

Think of the Iraqi anti-Sadr method as a form of suffocation, a political war waged with the blessing of Ayatollah Sistani that requires daily economic and political action, persistent police efforts and occasional military thrusts.

Yesterday a Time article analyzing How Moqtada al Sadr Won in Basra offered up some fascinating evidence of Sadr's invincibility.

He can now play the victim card... the Mahdi Army can claim a victory by simply surviving an assault by an Iraqi government backed by the Americans. That is significant street cred.

My, my, we do set the bar pretty low.

But today the Guardian reports that Iraqi government forces have moved into a Shia stronghold in the southern city.

Iraqi government forces entered a Shia militant stronghold in the southern city of Basra today, which has been rocked by fierce internecine clashes in recent weeks.

The move against the Mahdi army, the militia supporting the Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, comes a day after the Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, returned to Baghdad after spending a week in Basra overseeing a crackdown against Shia militants.

As the convoy of army and police forces, led by Lieutenant-General Mohan al-Fireji, entered the Hayaniyah area of the city, the troops began shooting into the air in a show of force.

I wonder if the folks in that Shia stronghold watching government forces move in saw it as a victory for the Mahdi Army.

Comments

[Smithington]

There's no question that six months from now we’ll have reached a turning point.

That would be the 6 month turning point we’ve reached for every 6 months during the past 6 years.