Dan Senor and Roman Martinez took to the Washington Post claiming to correct former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's revisionist history of the Iraq War. "Rumsfeld's basic theme is that the CPA erred by failing to grant Iraqis 'the right to govern themselves' early in the U.S.-led occupation," they write. They go on to dispute this by cherry picking quotes from a de-classified secret document Principles for Iraq - Policy Guidelines dated May 13, 2003. They write:
To the contrary, Rumsfeld's instructions endorsed the top-down approach his book condemns. The CPA should "assert authority over the country," he wrote, and should "not accept or tolerate self-appointed [Iraqi] 'leaders.' "
There should be "clarity that the Coalition is in charge, with no conflicting signals to the Iraqi people," Rumsfeld wrote. He directed Bremer to take a "hands-on" approach to Iraq's "political reconstruction," noting that "the Coalition will consistently steer the process to achieve the stated objectives" and should "not 'let a thousand flowers bloom.' " The "transition from despotism to a democracy will not happen easily or fast," he concluded, noting that "[r]ushing elections could lead to tyranny of the majority."
Here are a couple of paragraphs from Principals for Iraq - Policy Guidelines that they were forced to leave out of their article in order not to blow their entire argument.
8. Improve Conditions: Involve Iraqis. The Coalition will work energetically to improve the circumstances of the Iraqi people. It will work to achieve rapid and visible accomplishments in vital public services for the Iraqi people, and create an environment that encourages the involvement of the Iraqi people, for it is their responsibility to build the future of their country.
9. Promote Iraqis who share Coalition's goals. In staffing ministries and positioning Iraqis in ways that will increase their influence, the Coalition will work to have acceptable Iraqis involved as early as possible, so Iraqi voices can explain the goals and direction to the Iraqi people. Only if Iraqis are seen as being engaged in, responsible for, and explaining and leading their fellow citizens will broad public support develop that is essential for security. Regardless of what the Coalition does, however, Iraqi Interim Authority will be viewed generally as the Coalition's creation. Therefore, we will accept that fact, get on with the task and work to help make sure it succeeds.
If the phrases I emphasized above are any indication, the Bush administration wanted Iraqis involved and in leadership roles as early as possible, which would tend to support Rumsfeld's version of events.
And so does Douglas Feith in his book War and Decision. Unfortunately I can't find my copy of it for a pertinent quotation, but I found something else that's nearly as good. Citations for Chapter 14: "From Liberation to Occupation" include reference to a 2006 Washington Post column by none other than Dan Senor entitled The Realities Of Trying to Rebuild Iraq. Here's one of Mr. Senor's realities:
Speaking of policy, Chandrasekaran argues that the CPA should have listened more to professional civil servants and State Department Arabists. Yet his book concludes that the formal occupation of Iraq was itself America's biggest mistake. Instead of creating the CPA, he argues, the Bush administration should have moved quickly after Saddam Hussein's fall to empower a fully sovereign Iraqi government.
But that is precisely the policy that was vociferously opposed by the State Department's Middle East experts in the months leading up to the war. As Chandrasekaran himself points out earlier in the book, the State Department had, before the invasion, favored an extended occupation, in which the United States would retain power for a long period while gradually organizing elections and facilitating an Iraqi constitutional convention. Indeed, the approach Chandrasekaran now claims to prefer has much more in common with the rapid political transition plan backed by the very Pentagon neoconservatives he disparages throughout his account.
Senor's 2006 column lends support to a point made by Douglas Feith in his book: The State Department and the Pentagon were in disagreement over the transition policy for Iraq. State was envisioned an extended occupation while the Pentagon favored a rapid political transition to Iraqi control.
But wait! Wasn't Donald Rumsfeld in charge of the Pentagon? Weren't those neocons who favored rapid political transition part of his Pentagon team? Mr. Senor seems to be one revising history, and today he revised some of the history he wrote back in 2006.
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