Amir Taheri describes it.
Meanwhile, part of the media has tried to link the Bombay attacks to al Qaeda. This may be saying too much or too little. As an organization capable of exercising operational control over any group, al Qaeda is all but dead. The best information available, plus the buzz in Jihadi circles, indicates that al Qaeda is still collecting some funds, especially in the Persian Gulf, and funneling part of it to militant groups across the globe. Beyond that, however, al Qaeda is more of a brand, a kind of franchise, and a source of inspiration rather than command and control.
In Bombay, the Jihadis used a new style of attack, consisting of a range of operations that are traditionally used one by one. They have seized control of territory, carried out suicide operations, conducted military-style attacks and seized hostages, all in the context of a single multiform campaign of terror.
This new style, a kind of smorgasbord of terrorist tactics served at one go, confused the Indian counterterrorist units and army elite. Terrorism is a mutating monster, and Bombay's experience could be repeated in other big cities across the globe. Counterterrorism doctrine needs to readjust itself for what is a major tactical change in the way Jihadism works.